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ABSTRACT: The banking crisis of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC), which occurred at the beginning of the year 2000, has resulted in the 
liquidation of ten banks and ended up with economic losses of approximately 200 
trillion TL, almost equivalent to 50% of GNP for 1999. The main reason for such 
huge losses for the TRNC economy is due to the fact that the commercial banks and 
the institutions responsible for regulation, monitoring, supervision of the financial 
sector together with those running the monetary policies did not have an 
organizational appreciation of proactive strategies.  The amendments made to the 
Banking Law after the crises to reestablish stability within the sector could not go 
beyond reflecting the concept of reactive strategies and hence, did not include any 
proactive strategies necessary for eliminating the negative consequences of probable 
external factors. 
 
The main aim of this study is to analyze the basic problems of the banking sector in 
Northern Cyprus with partial emphasis on the applied proactive and reactive 
strategies and make recommendations accordingly. 
 
This study will include the following consecutive parts: 
• The concepts of proactive and reactive strategies 
• The current status and functionality of the TRNC Banking Sector 
• An analysis of the TRNC banking crisis 
• Structural problems of the banking sector in the TRNC 
• Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Keywords: TRNC, Banking Sector, Proactive and  Reactive Strategies    
 
ÖZET:Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nde (KKTC) 2000 yılının başında başlayan 
banka krizleri, 10 bankanın tasfiyesine ve 1999 Gayri Safi Milli Hasıla’sının 
(GSMH) % 50’sine tekabül edecek şekilde ekonomide 200 trilyon TL’lik kayıplara 
yol açmıştır.  Söz konusu banka krizlerinin temel sebepleri ise bankacılık ile ilgili 
gözetleme, denetleme ve düzenlemeden sorumlu kurum ve kuruluşların proaktif 
stratejileri benimsememeleridir.  Kriz sonrası sektörde istikrarı getirmek için başta 
yasal olmak üzere yapılan düzenlemeler, reaktif stratejilerin bir gereği olup  
özellikle dış çevrenin yaratacağı ve gelecekte olabilecek olumsuz unsurları dikkate 
almaktan uzaktır. 
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Bu çalışmanın temel amacı KKTC bankacılık sektörünün temel sorunlarını 
uygulanan reaktif ve proaktif stratejilere de vurgu yaparak analiz etmek ve bu yönde 
öneriler geliştirmektir. 
 
Çalışmada sırasıyla aşağıdaki kısımlar yer alacaktır. 
 
• Proaktif ve reaktif strateji kavramı 
• Bankacılık sektörünün yapısı 
• KKTC bankacılık krizinin analizi 
• KKTC bankacılık sektörünün yapısal sorunları 
• Sonuç ve Öneriler 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: KKTC, Bankacılık  Sektörü, Proaktif ve Reaktif Strateji  
 
1. Introduction 
Banking crises have become commonplace during the past two decades, but the 
range of experience in terms of the nature of crisis, causes and effects, varies widely 
across countries and at different periods in time. 
 
Much of the theory on banking crises focuses on the special characteristics of banks, 
such as maturity and currency transformation and asymmetric information, which 
make the industry particularly vulnerable to collapse following adverse shocks (e.g. 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988 and Diamond and Dybvig, 1986). Institutional 
features of economies, such as the existence of deposit insurance and market-
determined interest rate structures, are also emphasized in the literature as impacting 
the profitability of banks and the incentives of bank managers to take on risk in 
lending operations. The special features of banks, combined with particular 
institutional characteristics of economies, frequently lead to the emergence of 
banking problems when adverse macroeconomic shocks such as a fall in asset prices 
(impacting bank capital and/or collateral underlying loans) or economic activity 
(more delinquent loans) occurs. Adverse economic shocks may be of domestic origin 
(e.g. recession, inflation, budget deficits, credit slowdown) or external (e.g. external 
balance, exchange rate depreciation).  
 
Several common features of countries experiencing banking problems emerge from 
numerous case studies. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1998) report 
summarizes this literature and identifies several general categories of problems 
frequently associated with financial crises: unsustainable macroeconomic policies, 
weaknesses in financial structure, global financial conditions, exchange rate 
misalignments, and political instability. Macroeconomic instability, particularly 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies spurring lending booms and asset price 
bubbles, has been a factor in many episodes of banking sector distress, including 
most experienced by the industrial countries in the postwar period. External 
conditions, such as large shifts in the terms of trade and world interest rates, have 
played a large role in financial crises in emerging-market economies. By affecting 
the profitability of domestic firms, sudden external changes can adversely affect 
banks’ balance sheets.  
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Weakness in financial structure refers to a variety of circumstances ranging from the 
maturity structure and currency composition of international portfolio investment 
flows to the allocation and pricing of domestic credit through banking institutions. 
These weaknesses generally arise in times of rapid financial liberalization and 
greater market competition, when banks are taking on new and unfamiliar risks on 
both the asset and liability side of balance sheets. Weak supervisory and regulatory 
policies under these circumstances have also increased moral hazard by giving an 
incentive for financial institutions with low capital ratios to increase their risk 
positions in newly competitive environments, and allowing them to avoid full 
responsibility for mistakes in monitoring and evaluating risk. Further, deficiencies in 
accounting, disclosure, and legal frameworks contribute to the problem because they 
allow financial institutions (or financial regulators) to disguise the extent of their 
difficulties. Governments have frequently failed to quickly identify problemed 
institutions, or to take prompt corrective action when a problem arises, resulting in 
larger and more difficult crises. 
 
The TRNC banking sector which comprises almost all of the financial sector in the 
TRNC, has grown in numbers considerably under the influence of the liberalization 
trend of the 1980s; on the other hand, due to its deficiencies typical to those that 
cause crises as mentioned above, the sector could not go through a similar 
development to establish a sound and a reliable system and hence it has become 
vulnerable.  These deficiencies that made the sector vulnerable and finally took it all 
the way to a crisis have been analyzed in this study.  A part of the study has been 
allocated to the resulting reactive strategies put into action right after the crisis and a 
further discussion of possible proactive strategies have also been included. 
 
2. Concepts Of Proactive And Reactive Strategies 
A proactive strategy attempts to influence events in the environment rather than 
simply react to environmental forces as they occur. Its distinctive characteristic 
makes proactive strategy a powerful approach to considering uncertain future 
situations and hence it is useful to break through a current situation and is efficient to 
conceive alternatives.  Moreover, pursuing a proactive strategy is competitive under 
an uncertain business condition.  
 
On the other hand, a reactive strategy is a popular and an efficient problem solving 
approach, but it is applicable only when business conditions are stable.  Reactive 
strategy is persuasive as it has causal explanations and is powerful when continuous 
improvement is targeted. Moreover, reactive strategies are time-efficient. 
 
Reactive and proactive strategies can also be referred to as “today-for-today” and 
“today-for-tomorrow” strategies respectively. In this respect, planning for today 
requires a clear, precise definition of the business - a delineation of target customer 
segments, customer functions, and the business approach to be taken; planning for 
tomorrow is concerned with how the business should be redefined for the future. 
Planning for today focuses on shaping up the business to meet the needs of today's 
customers with excellence. It involves identifying factors that are critical to success 
and smothering them with attention: planning for tomorrow can entail reshaping the 
business to compete more effectively in the future. Planning for today seeks to 
achieve compliance in the firm's functional activities with whatever definition of the 
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business has been chosen: planning for tomorrow often involves bold moves away 
from existing ways of conducting the business. Planning for today requires an 
organization that mirrors current business opportunities; planning for tomorrow may 
require reorganization for future challenges. 
 
In short, planning for today, or in other words a reactive strategy, is about managing 
current activities with excellence; on the other hand, pursuing a proactive strategy 
involves planning for tomorrow and is about managing change. 
 
Although both reactive and proactive strategies involve some type of change, 
reactive strategy is about the “tuning up” kind of change that needs to take place to 
ensure that functional activities are well aligned with strategy whereas the proactive 
strategies are pursued to create change, not merely anticipating it. Proaction not only 
involves the important attributes of flexibility and adaptability toward an uncertain 
future, but it also takes the initiative in improving business (Bateman, 1999). 
 
Both reactive and proactive strategies have their own strengths and weaknesses; for 
example, the outcomes of proactive strategies are only possible - not plausible – 
scenarios and they are less persuasive when compared with reactive strategies as no 
causation is involved. Reactive strategies are thought to be more applicable to daily 
business thinking than proactive strategies and at the same time they-reactive 
strategies- are more time efficient since proactive strategies are time-consuming in 
the planning stage - though agile in the implementation stage. 
 
A reactive strategy might sometimes seem to be preferable over a proactive strategy 
when its strengths over proactive, especially in areas of plausible scenarios, 
persuasiveness and time-efficiency are considered; however, the fact that a reactive 
strategy cannot propose drastic changes and is powerless when business conditions 
are uncertain, imposes a deficiency in its utilization and this is to be carefully noted 
under the possibility that “tuning-up” of existing systems and processes (pursuing a 
today-for-today/reactive strategy) will not be sufficient for organizational 
performance and success in the uncertainty of the future. On the other hand, 
proactive strategies involve defining new problems, finding new solutions, and 
providing active leadership through an uncertain future (Bateman, 1999). As Abell 
(1999) puts forward in medical analogy, measuring temperature, blood pressure and 
other vital signs of a patient are part of a today-for today (reactive) way of thinking; 
for insuring a healthy future it is necessary to act proactively by looking below the 
surface at the root causes of disease or health and meanwhile taking the necessary 
measures in order not to eliminate the risk of any future temperature and the blood 
pressure elevations. 
 
3. Current Status And Functionality Of TRNC Banking Sector 
The number of banks in the TRNC has drastically gone down from 37 in 1999 to the 
current 25 (Northern Cyprus Bankers’ Association, 2003). The driving force behind 
this fall has been the economic and financial crises, which swept the country starting 
from late 1999 through 2000 and most of 2001. 
 
There are 25 banks now functioning under the new Banking Law has come into force 
in November 2001. The new law includes a large number of amendments in its 
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content (when compared with the original 1976 law) in an attempt to safeguard the 
banking system against future probable crises. 
 
The distribution of the banks by sectors is given below: 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Banks 
SECTOR NUMBER 
State Banks 2 
Cooperative Banks (operating under the Banking Law) 2 
Commercial Banks 16 
Foreign Banks 5 
TOTAL 25 
Source: Northern Cyprus Bankers’ Association, 2002. 
 
Along with the 25 local banks, there are 32 off-shore banks operating in the TRNC. 
Most of the off-shore banks are owned and operated by their parent banking 
corporations headquartered in Turkey. 
 
The share of the banking sector in GDP has been steadily going down since 1999, 
until then it had followed an upward trend. Its share was 6.3% with 568.4 million TL 
(in 1977 prices) and has decreased to 4.8% with 416.1 million TL (in 1977 prices – 
see Table 2 and Table 3). Again, the economic crises have been the main driving 
force behind this decline. It is interesting to note that the current share is almost the 
same as the sector’s share back in 1992; hence, it could be deduced that the crisis 
took the sector ten years back in development. 
 
Table 2: Sectoral Developments in Gross National Product (GNP) 
 
(1977 Prices 
 Million TL)      
(1977 Prices 
 Million TL) 
Sectors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021 
1. Agriculture 870.8 601.0 636.2 822.0  713.5  828.4 869.3 
1.1. Agriculture and Livestock 670.1 539.0 573.1 734.4  619.7  770.7 806.4 
1.2. Forestry 155.3 14.9 15.7 40.0  42.9  12.7 17.6 
1.3. Fishing 45.4 47.1 47.4 47.6  50.9  45.0 45.3 
2. Industry 982.2 1,017.7 1,029.6 1,054.2  1,096.0  1,025.0 1,057.4 
2.1. Quarrying  24.4 26.4 27.6 27.9  31.2  27.0 27.4 
2.2. Manufacturing 815.7 841.1 842.9 853.3  884.0  822.8 851.6 
2.3. Electricity – Water 142.1 150.2 159.1 173.0  180.8  175.2 178.4 
3. Construction 523.3 647.5 694.6 708.6  841.4  669.6 643.2 
4. Trade-Tourism 1,244.5 1,317.9 1,450.9 1,558.7  1,474.6  1,246.4 1,366.3 
4.1. Wholesale and Retail Trade 1,033.6 1,076.2 1,201.4 1,280.9  1,186.4  991.8 1,084.4 
4.2. Hotels and Restaurants 210.9 241.7 249.5 277.8  288.2  254.6 281.9 
5. Transport-Communication 856.9 937.3 974.6 1,043.3  1,113.6  1,108.2 1,128.2 
6. Financial Institutions 423.7 482.1 524.4 568.4  529.6  434.3 416.1 
7. Ownership Of Dwellings 417.2 428.7 440.6 451.7  461.7  475.8 493.4 
8. Business and Personal Services 518.5 655.7 679.2 784.0  700.0  800.1 801.0 
9. Public Services 1,351.1 1,358.6 1,406.1 1,438.6  1,483.3  1,461.7 1,460.0 
10. Import Duties 449.5 521.1 547.6 584.4  604.5  486.2 523.7 
11. GDP 7,637.7 7,967.6 8,383.8 9,013.9  9,018.2  8,535.7 8,758.6 
12. Net Factor Income From Abroad 35.7 22.8 84.3 76.9  19.7  10.2 10.7 
GNP 7,673.4 7,990.4 8,468.1 9,090.8  9,037.9  8,545.9 8,769.3 
1Provisional Figures        
Source:  State Planning Organization, 2002       
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Table – 3 Sectoral Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (1977 Prices, %) 
Sectors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021 
1. Agriculture 11.4 7.6 7.6 9.1 7.9  9.7 9.9 
1.1. Agriculture and Livestock 8.8 6.8 6.8 8.2 6.8  9.0 9.2 
1.2. Forestry 2.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5  0.2 0.2 
1.3. Fishing 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6  0.5 0.5 
2. Industry 12.9 12.8 12.3 11.7 12.2  12.0 12.1 
2.1. Quarrying  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4  0.3 0.3 
2.2. Manufacturing 10.7 10.6 10.1 9.5 9.8  9.6 9.7 
2.3. Electricity - Water 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0  2.1 2.1 
3. Construction 6.8 8.1 8.3 7.8 9.3  7.8 7.3 
4. Trade-Tourism 16.3 16.5 17.3 17.3 16.4  14.6 15.6 
4.1. Wholesale and Retail Trade 13.5 13.5 14.3 14.2 13.2  11.6 12.4 
4.2. Hotels and Restaurants 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2  3.0 3.2 
5. Transport-Communication 11.2 11.8 11.6 11.6 12.3  13.0 12.9 
6. Financial Institutions 5.5 6.0 6.2 6.3 5.9  5.1 4.8 
7. Ownership Of Dwellings 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.0 5.1  5.6 5.6 
8. Business and Personal Services 6.8 8.2 8.1 8.7 7.8  9.4 9.1 
9. Public Services 17.7 17.1 16.8 16.0 16.4  17.1 16.7 
10. Import Duties 5.9 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.7  5.7 6.0 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
1Provisional Figures        
Source: State Planning Organization, 2002 
 
As seen from Table 4 (Real Growth Rates), almost all sectors in TRNC economy have 
been considerably affected by the economic crises after 1999. The growth rates, which 
had been in an upward trend until then, dropped heavily in 2000 and 2001.  However, the 
downward trend seems to be stabilizing for 2002, except for the Construction and the 
financial sectors. For 2002, a positive real growth rate is expected for all sectors; however, 
it seems that the recovery for the banking sector (and the construction sector) will take a 
longer time as still a negative growth rate is projected for this vital sector of the TRNC 
economy. A negative growth rate of –4.2% is the lowest among all sectors for 2002. 
 
Table – 4    Real Growth Rates of Sectoral Value Added (%) 
Sectors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021 
1. Agriculture 8.9 -31.0 5.9 29.2 -13.2 16.1 4.9 
1.1. Agriculture and Livestock -0.4 -19.6 6.3 28.2 -15.6 24.4 7.3 
1.2. Forestry 90.6 -90.4 5.4 154.8 7.3 -70.4 38.6 
1.3. Fishing -0.4 3.7 0.6 0.4 6.9 -11.6 0.7 
2. Industry -1.9 3.6 1.2 2.4 4.0 -6.5 3.2 
2.1. Quarrying  -0.4 8.2 4.3 1.2 11.8 -13.5 1.5 
2.2. Manufacturing -2.6 3.1 0.2 1.2 3.6 -6.9 3.5 
2.3. Electricity – Water 1.6 5.7 5.9 8.7 4.5 -3.1 1.8 
3. Construction 3.1 23.7 7.3 2.0 18.7 -20.4 -3.9 
4. Trade-Tourism -10.6 5.9 10.1 7.4 -5.4 -15.5 9.6 
4.1. Wholesale and Retail Trade -10.0 4.1 11.6 6.6 -7.4 -16.4 9.3 
4.2. Hotels and Restaurants -13.4 14.6 3.2 11.3 3.7 -11.7 10.7 
5. Transport-Communication 5.5 9.4 4.0 7.0 6.7 -0.5 1.8 
6. Financial Institutions 3.5 13.8 8.8 8.4 -6.8 -18.0 -4.2 
7. Ownership Of Dwellings 1.6 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.2 3.1 3.7 
8. Business and Personal Services 84.8 26.5 3.6 15.5 -10.7 14.3 0.1 
9. Public Services 2.6 0.6 3.5 2.3 3.1 -1.5 -0.1 
10. Import Duties 4.9 15.9 5.1 6.7 3.4 -19.6 7.7 
11. GDP 3.8 4.3 5.2 7.5 . -5.4 2.6 
12. Net Factor Income From Abroad -63.5 -36.1 269.3   -8.8 -74.4 -48.2 4.9 
GNP 2.9 4.1 6.0 7.4 -0.6 -5.4 2.6 
1Provisional Figures 
Source:  State Planning Organization, 2002 
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The banking sector had been booming until the crisis and a true indication of this had 
been the number of people employed in the sector. Until 2000, both the employment 
and its share in the economy had been increasing; however, due to a decrease in 
number of banks by 12 as a result of the banking crisis, these figures have gone 
down in the recent years. Currently, only 2.6% (2,397 people) of the working 
population is employed in the sector, and this number is equal to the sector’s share of 
back in 1988, 14 years ago. 
 
Table – 5  Sectoral Distribution of Working Population 
Sectors 1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 2000 % 2001 % 2002 5 % 
1. Agriculture1 16,862 21.0 16,188 9.5 15,864 8.7 15,547 7.8 15,236 7.1 14,931 6.5 14,632 15.8 
1.1. Agriculture and 
Livestock - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1.2. Forestry - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1.3. Fishing - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2. Industry 8,356 10.4 8,428 0.1 8,481 0.0 8,552 9.8 8,715 9.6 8,715 9.6 8,889 9.6 
2.1. Quarrying  978 1.2 1,014 1.2 1,037 1.2 1,043 1.2 1,105 1.2 1,105 1.2 1,123 1.2 
2.2. Manufacturing 6,107 7.6 6,120 7.3 6,125 7.2 6,153 7.0 6,234 7.0 6,234 6.9 6,382 6.9 
2.3. Electricity – Water 1,271 1.6 1,294 1.6 1,319 1.6 1,356 1.5 1,376 1.5 1,376 1.5 1,384 1.5 
3. Construction 9,792 12.2 11,547 3.9 12,177 4.3 12,361 4.1 14,104 5.8 14,104 5.6 14,104 15.3 
4. Trade-Tourism2 8,367 10.4 8,730 0.5 9,095 0.6 9,536 0.9 9,630 0.8 9,630 0.7 10,565 11.4 
4.1. Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 5,470 6.8 5,535 6.7 5,826 6.8 6,000 6.9 6,000 6.7 6,000 6.7 6,496 7.0 
4.2. Hotels and 
Restaurants 2,897 3.6 3,195 3.8 3,269 3.8 3,536 4.0 3,630 4.1 3,630 4.0 4,069 4.4 
5. Transport-
Communication 6,734 8.4 7,192 8.6 7,389 8.7 7,747 8.8 8,104 9.1 8,104 9.0 8,221 8.9 
6. Financial 
Institutions 2,456 3.1 2,693 3.2 2,858 3.4 3,026 3.5 2,397 2.7 2,397 2.7 2,397 2.6 
7. Business and 
Personal Services3  10,848 13.5 11,454 3.8 11,750 3.8 13,057 4.9 13,057 4.6 14,401 5.9 15,469 16.8 
8. Public Services4 16,899 21.0 16,972 0.4 17,399 0.5 17,689 0.2 18,084 0.2 18,084 0.0 18,084 19.6 
Total Employment 80,314 100 83,204 100 85,013 100 87,515 100 89,327 100 90,366 100 92,361 100 
1
 Sub-sectoral distribution of Agriculture was not possible after 1982 due to lack of data. 
2
 Trade and tourism sectors were considered separately after 1982. 
3
 Business and Personal services were included in Public Services before 1983. 
4 SEE and Municipalities are included. 
5Provisional Figures 
Source: State Planning Organization, 2002 
 
Before the banking crisis, there had been a steady increase in deposits hold at the 
banks as seen in Table 6, with the maximum reached with 837.2 million USD at the 
end of 1999. The crisis not only hampered the banks’ reliability but also gave rise to 
a major decline in the amount of deposits as a direct consequence of this reliability 
syndrome.  A decline by 4.12% in 2000 together with an only a fraction of an 
increase in 2001 are true indicators for the reliability problem in the banking sector. 
Additionally, lower purchasing power and unemployment as direct consequences of 
the economic crisis together with stagnation were other factors behind the decline in 
bank deposits.   
 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that there has been a considerable increase in 
deposits in the first five months of 2002. One reason for this is the obvious 
reestablishment of the deposit-makers’ confidence in the banking sector; the public, 
once hesitant to make deposits at the banks after the banking crisis, have “come 
back” and fed the system once again. The other reason for this increase could be due 
to the still stagnant economy; as seen from Table 7, banks have been having a hard 
time in lending out money as a result of the economic crisis after 1999; the yearly 
Okan ŞAFAKLI 224 
percentage change in loans have been under the inflation rate since the end of 1999 
and this situation is still prevalent even today.  This indicates that there is a very 
small amount of investment made for businesses and almost no alternative 
investment instrument (though very few do exist, they are unfortunately not very 
common among the public yet) in the country and as a result, a large sum of loose 
money goes into the bank deposits. (The considerable increase in deposits in the first 
five months of 2002 is also due in part to the uncommon drop in the USD exchange 
rate between December 2001 and May 2002; this has resulted in an above normal 
increase in the USD equivalent of TRL deposits, affecting the total considerably.) 
 
Table 6: Deposits at the banks and % change 
YEAR TL DEPOSITS (Million TRL) 
FOREIGN 
CURRENCY 
DEPOSITS 
(USD) 
TOTAL DEPOSITS 
(in TRL equivalent, 
trillion TRL) 
 
TOTAL  
DEPOSITS 
(in USD equivalent, 
million USD) 
% Change in 
Deposits 
(in USD 
equivalent) 
1996 18,769,501 406,523,100 61.42 581.3 - 
1997 41,818,380 454,743,300 134.42 659.1 13.38 
1998 73,750,887 499,541,300 229.25 735.7 11.62 
1999 172,426,892 517,629,300 529.69 837.2  13.80 
2000 213,915,391 484,021,800 538.82 802.7 - 4.12 
2001 419,443,317 514,068,300 1,159.6  805.4 0.34 
May 2002 556,667,057 570,773,300 1,351.7 970.41 20.481 
Source:  TRNC Central Bank Bulletin No: 28 dated 28 Sept.2000 and State Planning Organization. 
 
Table 7:  Bank Loans 
YEAR  Loans 
(Million TRL) 
% Change 
from Previous Year 
Inflation Rate 
(Retail Price Index) 
1996 46,047,462 83.74 87.5 
1997 111,655,377 142.48 81.7 
19981 236,078,442 111.43 66.5 
19991 551,399,571 133.57 55.3 
2000 525,201,259 - 4.75 53.2 
2001 752,698,681 43.31 76.8 
May 2002 759,590,937 0.92 7.33 
1
 In 1998 and 1999, the loans are reported to be greater than the deposits; there could be two reasons for 
this: either there is a   difference in methods used by the Central Bank and the State Planning 
Organization, especially in using the appropriate exchange rate in converting TRL amounts to USD and 
vice versa or Development Bank’s loans have also be taken into account – Development Bank is not a 
deposit-taker, hence loans could be higher than the deposits. 
Source:  State Planning Organization, 2002 
 
4. Analysis Of The TRNC Banking Crisis 
Early in 1999, being aware that there were a large number of banks with difficulties, the 
TRNC Economy and Finance Ministry, which was responsible for regulating the banks 
at that time, resolved to start the process of rehabilitation for the banking sector. 
 
The production and circulation of the banking law draft goes back to the summer of 
1999. The proposed new banking law was based largely on the banking law of Turkey, 
and was deemed to be an improvement on the 11/1976 Banking Law passed in 1976. 
 
One of the major problems with the 11/1976 Banking Law was that it allowed for the 
creation of new banks with a minimum capital requirement of TRL 50,000 million (as 
at 30 June, 1999 this amount was equivalent to USD 119,683). The proposed law 
sought to increase the minimum capital requirement to USD 2,000,000 and gave 
existing banks two years to raise their capital and reserves to this level. 
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Another major departure from the existing law was to link maximum lending limits to 
the capital and reserves of the banks, instead of the banks’ deposits. 
 
The proposed law was opposed by a number of prominent bank owners, which saw the 
proposals as an intention to drive the local banks out of business, and leave the sector in 
the hands of banks from Turkey. 
 
This resistance meant that the year 1999 passed without any concrete efforts being 
made to rehabilitate the banking sector, and led to the banking crisis of the year 2000. 
 
Studies of systemic banking crises have identified the following factors as being their 
roots causing: 
• Poor risk analysis by banks (Black, 1995: 6-8), 
• Weak internal credit control systems, 
• Connected lending (Hoenig, 1999;Aydın, 2000:13-30), 
• Insufficient capital, 
• Ineffective regulation, monitoring and supervision by regulatory agencies, 
• Weak internal governance, 
• Speculative activities, 
• High leverage. (Llewellyn, 1999;  Caprio, 1998; Huang ve  Vajid, 2002; 
Erdönmez ve Tülay 2001 ; Sundararjan ve Balino, 1991) 
 
Poor risk analysis by banks occurs at excessive credit creation times which is associated 
with the expansion phase of the business cycle. A crisis is triggered when the bubble 
bursts. Recent experience has shown that both bank lending booms and declines in 
asset prices have often preceded banking crises. 
 
Weak internal credit control systems mean that a bank fails to effectively monitor its 
loan book. Hence, problem loans are not spotted early enough to reduce the loss to the 
bank. 
 
Connected lending is a feature of many insolvent banks. This is where the bank is 
lending to companies or development projects connected with the bank owners or 
managers. Often the bank at below market interest rates and with no collateral security 
agrees these loans. The bank does not call in the loans even if the endeavor being 
financed is blatantly unprofitable, in the hope that things will turn more favorable in the 
future. 
 
Insufficient capital means that the bank has no cushion to soften the shock of an 
economic downturn. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has set out a 
minimum capital ratio standard for all international banks. A committee of prominent 
central bankers, referred to as the Basle Committee (Basle is the city where the BIS is 
situated) set a minimum of 8% capital to risk weighted assets ratio. This standard has 
been adopted throughout the world, including the TRNC. The capital to risk weighted 
assets ratio is a more important measure of a bank’s soundness than the total capital and 
reserves it possesses. 
 
Ineffective regulation, monitoring and supervision by regulatory agencies, this is 
especially a factor in a banking crisis when there has been liberalization of the financial 
sector. Banks rush into new risks without proper assessment and the supervisory 
authorities are unprepared for the new activities. Interest rates may be liberalized, banks 
lose the protection they previously enjoyed under the regulated term structure of 
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interest rates, which normally keep short-term rates below long-term rates. The 
competition for deposits pushes interest rates higher, thereby increasing the interest rate 
charged on loans, which may cause some loans to become non-performing. 
 
Weak internal governance means that the bank is unable to control rogue elements 
within itself, usually in the proprietary trading section. This is where the bank dealers in 
marketable securities undertake trades on behalf of the bank, the bank is in effect 
speculating on its own account. Poor internal controls may result in traders taking on 
more risk than is authorized, should the trade result in a profit, the bank’s traders stand 
to receive a big bonus for the year, however any loss will have to be borne by the 
bank’s shareholders, and the traders may only lose their jobs. 
 
Speculative activities are similar in character to the rogue trader activity, however this 
time the speculation is undertaken with the consent of the bank’s top management. 
 
High leverage may apply to the bank, where it is taking on greater risk than its capital 
can carry, pushing its capital to risk weighted assets below the minimum of 8%, or it 
may apply to the borrowers, where the bank is happy lending to ventures at high 
leverages, that is the borrowers are committing only a small fraction of their own funds 
into the venture and using mainly bank finance. Any venture, which is highly leveraged 
with borrowings, is at risk to rises in interest rates; even a small rise may push its 
operations into loss. 
 
Low GDP growth, excessively high real interest rates and high inflation increase the 
likelihood of systemic banking crises, according to Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache(1998:83). However, they point out that a weak macroeconomic 
environment is not the sole factor, and that structural characteristics of the banking 
sector and of the economic environment in general also play a role. 
 
Analyzing the TRNC banking crisis of 2000, we can see that all of the eight factors 
listed above were true for the period, and that the macroeconomic environment was 
also very weak. 
 
The five-year period prior to the banking crisis was a period of high real interest rates 
and during this period the number of banks increased from twenty to thirty-seven. 
These two facts are among the causes of the banking crisis. 
 
The increase in the number of banks was not followed by an increase in the number of 
banking supervisors, working in the banking supervision section of the TRNC Central 
Bank. Consequently, the supervisors were unable to effectively inspect the banks. Many 
of the newly formed banks and some of the established banks were operating with 
insufficient capital. 
 
High real interest rates caused deterioration in the quality of the loans granted by banks. 
Many borrowers became unable to service their loans. Interest piled up on the existing 
loans at ever-increasing amounts; such that some borrowers were left in a position, 
whereby the collateral security they had put up for the loan became worth less than the 
sum owed to the bank. In this scenario, the borrower has no incentive to repay the loan. 
 
Instead of provisioning against possible loan loss, banks were renewing loan 
agreements to cover the original loan and the interest accrued. However important these 
two factors were in the making of the banking crisis, the major factor was the connected 
lending and looting of the banks by their owners and managers. 
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Some bank owners were using their banks to channel funds into their own, mostly 
unprofitable, trading activities even though The 11/1976 Banking Law limited the 
amount of this type of connected lending in such a way that maximum limit could not 
exceed 2% of total deposits or 10% of capital and reserves, whichever being the larger 
amount. Unfortunately, although it was common knowledge that some banks had 
exceeded this limit no action was taken against the bank owners. 
 
It was later revealed that the amount of connected lending in the insolvent banks ranged 
from 50% to 90% of total loans, far in excess of statutory limits.  
 
The banking crisis was triggered by the taking over of Yurtbank AŞ by the Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund in Turkey in December 1999, Yurtbank AŞ had a sister bank in 
the TRNC, in both banks the majority shares were belong to the Balkaner group. 
Depositors began to withdraw funds from Kıbrıs Yurtbank Ltd, and the bank run 
quickly spread to other banks. By the end of January 2000, four banks had succumbed 
to the bank run, and were placed under state control. 
 
In an attempt to stop the flight of deposits from the perceived weaker banks, in 
February 2000, the state passed a law providing 100% guarantee to depositors, at the 
same time increasing the deposit protection fund insurance premium from 0.4% of 
deposits to 1% of deposits per annum. 
 
However, the total guarantee was not on its own sufficient to stop the flight of funds 
from some banks, and by the time the crisis had run its course, at the end of 2001, 
twelve banks had failed. 
 
5. Structural Problems Of The Banking Sector In the TRNC 
Banking sector of the TRNC is surrounded by serious structural problems, which 
carried more importance after banking crises. These problems can be summarized 
under the following headings. 
 
5.1   Problems Of Monetary Policy In The TRNC 
The legal tender in the TRNC is the Turkish Lira. Because of the use of another 
country’s currency, the TRNC Central Bank has little control over monetary policy. In 
effect, the only monetary control instrument available to it is the reserve requirement. 
Currently the minimum reserve requirement on Turkish Lira deposits is 14% and on 
foreign currency deposits 15%. There is also a liquidity requirement of 10% on all 
deposits, payment orders and realized tax liabilities. The only liquid assets, which 
qualify for the liquidity requirement, are: 
(a) Cash; 
(b) Current account balances at the TRNC Central Bank; 
(c) Payable on demand TRNC bonds; 
(d) TRNC Development Bank bonds with a maximum maturity of one year; 
(e) Discount facility provided by the TRNC Central Bank. (TRNC Central Bank 
Notice No: 362 dated 30 July 1993) 
  
There is no money market in the TRNC, the TRNC Central Bank has tried several 
times to start an interbank money market, organized within itself, but these attempts 
have never come to operation. The absence of an interbank money market has meant 
that the fallout effect of banks becoming insolvent has not directly affected the healthy 
banks. 
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5.2   Problems Of Banking Operations In The TRNC 
Due to an absence of any capital market, the banks are the only conduits for financial 
intermediation. The TRNC banking sector is not under any strain from financial 
disintermediation, as is the case in developed economies. 
 
Traditionally the banks have offered depositors limited choice in the type of savings 
accounts. However, as the depositors become more financially aware, through the 
economy pages of daily newspapers (local and from Turkey), the demand for other 
types of financial instruments is being satisfied. This demand is for Turkish Securities 
and for Turkish Treasury Bonds. Banks operating in the TRNC as branches of 
mainland Turkish banks have an advantage here, since they are integrated into the 
Turkish banking sector, and thereby have access to the money and capital markets of 
Turkey. Hence, this service began to be provided through these branches as a reaction 
to depositor demand. Reacting to this demand local TRNC banks also began to offer 
these services, though on a much lower level, since they cannot enter the money and 
capital markets directly, and must go through their correspondent banks. 
 
The standard strategy followed by TRNC banks has been to seek deposits, which are 
then channeled into assets such as loans and Turkish Treasury Bonds. Because of the 
fact that the interest differential between deposits and Turkish Treasury Bonds is 
usually high enough to warrant banks to hold Treasury Bonds as a major part of their 
assets, the banks have not been under any pressure to find a strategy, which would 
stimulate the demand for loans. Branch networks were created to maximize the 
collection of deposits, this is shown by the fact that there is only one bank branch in the 
Lefkoşa Organized Industrial Park, and this was opened relatively recently in 1998. 
 
There was no effort by any bank to adopt a strategy to challenge the traditional activity. 
All banks followed a reactive strategy, competing with each other according to each 
bank’s own characteristics. 
 
Banking supervision, under the authority of the TRNC Central Bank, also followed a 
reactive strategy. Until recently, the supervisors seldom visited the banks, due in part to 
the fact that the number of banks they had to supervise did not match to the number of 
bank supervisors. Supervision relied heavily on the monthly reports prepared by each 
bank and sent to the Central Bank. 
 
However, after the banking crisis of 2000, the TRNC Central Bank began to foster 
change in the banking sector. Regarding banking supervision as its primary task, the 
TRNC Central Bank has recruited new personnel for the banking supervision 
department. The status quo has been shaken up by the issuing of ten new notices by the 
TRNC Central Bank, regulating everything that banks do. Their strategy is to work 
proactively with the banks, in order to create a stronger banking sector. 
 
The new regulatory notices are aimed at bringing banking practices into line with 
international standards, especial attention is being accorded to capital adequacy, with 
the adoption of the Basle criteria of a minimum 8% capital adequacy ratio. Hence, it 
can be said that the strategy of the TRNC Central Bank is proactive in the way it is 
forcing change on the banking sector. 
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Proactivity in strategic outlook is not confined to the central Bank, some commercial 
banks are also rethinking their strategies and attempting to foresee customer demand, 
and thereby cater for customer needs, which have been identified. The local 
commercial banks are aware that in order to continue in business and increase value for 
shareholders, they must actively seek out and identify niche markets, otherwise their 
existence is under threat coming from the branch offices of the large Turkish banks 
operating in the TRNC. 
 
5.3    Problems Of Electronic Banking In The TRNC  
Starting in late 1980s local banks began implementing branch automation systems to 
offer their traditional services like checking & savings accounts, money transfers, trade 
transactions, but they have not planned, implemented or integrated these systems in 
way that they would bring them a competitive advantage and help them not to lose any 
customer to their competitors.  In a way, these IT implementations were not a part of a 
proactive strategy; they were simply aimed to cut down the work load on the banks’ 
own staff and lower expenses – a direct consequence of a reactive thinking (“too much 
work for staff, high expenses for the bank, do something to ease things”).  
 
Things started to change later on in mid 1990s when customers, especially the younger 
ones, started to demand the same services that others have been receiving in other parts 
of the world, especially in Turkey.  As a result, some local banks realized that they need 
information systems that are critical for their long-term prosperity and more importantly 
for their survival. This was then a catalyst for few local banks to reconsider their 
information systems. They realized that if they had continued to do business as before 
with their current banking systems, they could have easily lose the competition to other 
banks, especially to those based in Turkey and having branches in TRNC. A local bank 
made the initial step with the introduction of ATM services in mid 1990s. The decision 
for offering ATM services was one of a kind, as it was an outcome of both reactive 
thinking (same services offered by Turkish Banks in TRNC) and proactive thinking (act 
before losing the competition to Turkish Banks).  
 
In the last few years, local banks have been eager and fast in getting into the retail 
banking market through credit cards and POS (point of sale) terminals. Local banks 
have always had loyal customers but after the recent striking economic events, 
customer loyalty has diminished and local banks started losing customers against their 
competitor Turkish banks (local branches of mainland Turkish banks) with extensive 
retail banking capabilities.  In order to compete with their Turkish rivals in the retail 
field of electronic banking, local banks offer the same services in cooperation with 
some banks in Turkey, though less efficiently and with almost no profit. This act has 
been an outcome of both reactive and proactive thinking such that it is reactive as the 
efforts have aimed to satisfy the current needs of the customers, and proactive in the 
sense that the local banks would have otherwise lost their customer portfolio to the 
Turkish Banks. 
 
 It has been a real task for local banks to offer electronic retail banking services such as 
overseas fund transfers, credit cards, POS and ATMs as these services require 
membership to foreign global networks like SWIFT, Visa and MasterCard; 
unfortunately, being operating in an unrecognized country, local banks have been 
denied membership to such networks and hence they are currently unable to issue their 
own international credit cards and register their local ATMs to global networks (even to 
the Turkish Interbank Card Center network–BKM network).  This has created an unfair 
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competition in the banking sector, as Turkish banks were able to penetrate into the 
market easily while the locals could only accomplish a minimal success in doing so. 
The fact that a local bank should cooperate with another party (a Turkish bank in this 
case) in order to provide credit card and POS services, negatively affects its operation 
in terms of high expenses, difficulties in independent operation and decision-making. 
 
Another factor, which directly affects the electronic banking penetration in the sector, is 
the population size of the country. When combined with the adverse effect of the high 
number of banks in the sector, the small population and the resulting small customer 
portfolio per bank make electronic banking investments almost infeasible. Electronic 
banking services require a high initial investment and a continual operating expenses 
and it is not feasible to provide such services to customer portfolios in terms of only 
few thousands. On the other hand, Turkish banks in TRNC do not make any initial 
investment as they simply use the already established infrastructure in Turkey; 
moreover, their operating costs for electronic banking services are much lower due 
economics of scale. 
 
Local banks have been trying constantly to keep up with the technology and provide the 
same electronic banking services their Turkish competitors have been providing. Major 
local banks now offer credit card, POS and ATM services, and a couple of them have 
on-going internet banking projects; however, due to the unfavorable conditions – 
operating in an unrecognized country, small population size (small customer base) and 
the high number of banks on top of these – electronic banking services offered by local 
banks have not reached to a satisfactory level within the TRNC. 
 
5.4    The Impact Of The Cyprus Problem On The Banking Sector 
The TRNC is not recognized internationally. Non-recognition has caused some 
problems to the banking sector; chief among these is the absence of foreign direct 
investment. Other practical difficulties include the exclusion of TRNC banks from 
worldwide organizations such as SWIFT (a secure electronic fund transfer and 
communication system among international banks) and the card payment companies 
VISA and MASTERCARD. 
 
The prospect of a solution to the Cyprus Problem presents the TRNC banking sector 
with opportunities and threats. The economy is expected to grow sharply; this will 
create increasing demand for banking services. The opportunity here is that local 
TRNC banks will pick up most of the increasing business. There is a perceived threat 
that strongly capitalized Greek-Cypriot banks will dominate the banking sector in a 
unified state, however, due to the nature of the industry and the emphasis on personal 
relationships, it is believed that the Turkish-Cypriot banks will lose business to the 
Greek-Cypriot banks. 
 
6.  Conclusion And Recommendations 
In this study, basic structure of the TRNC banking sector, an analysis of the TRNC 
Banking Crisis and the structural problems of the TRNC banking sector have been 
evaluated. Furthermore, the importance of proactive strategies for the banking sector 
has been emphasized. The main findings of the study can be summarized as follows: 
 
Proactive strategies will become increasingly important for the TRNC banking sector 
as the financial sector recovers from the effects of the banking crisis and begins to 
channel funds into the real sector. 
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The banking crisis resulted in an initial reduction of total deposits in the banking sector, 
which then steadied in 2001 and began to rise again in 2002. 
 
As can be seen from Table 7 the growth of loans has not kept up with the rate of 
inflation for the past three years. In real terms, there has been a reduction in total loans 
granted by the banks. The primary problem for banks today, is to channel funds into 
viable projects, under the prevailing economically stagnant environment. 
 
The causes of the banking crisis, which were outlined above, have been identified and 
are being addressed by the regulatory authorities. The TRNC Central Bank, responsible 
for banking supervision, has set out a proactive strategy for rehabilitating the banking 
sector, albeit with a degree of reactive tactics, such as closer monitoring of bank 
balance sheets and profit and loss statements. 
 
The trend today is to separate the monetary control and banking supervision functions 
traditionally carried out by central banks. In the UK, banking supervision is now the 
responsibility of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and in Turkey, banking 
supervision is the responsibility of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board 
(BDDK), whereas previously in both these countries the central banks used to have 
banking supervision departments. Should the TRNC follow this example? Considering 
the size of the banking sector and the minimum function of the TRNC Central Bank, 
with regard to monetary control, the authors believe that banking supervision should 
remain in the hands of the TRNC Central Bank. This is especially important since the 
Central Bank has been granted autonomy from political control and is now independent 
to exercise its authority. 
 
Because there are 25 banks operating in the TRNC, mergers and acquisitions between 
banks is a possibility, and could solve the problems of insufficient capital and the need 
to cut costs. The state should set an example here and merge the two state controlled 
banks, namely Kıbrıs Vakıflar Bankası Ltd and Akdeniz Garanti Bankası Ltd, however 
political considerations overshadow economic sense, the ruling coalition have shared 
out the control of the of the state banks among themselves and refused to agree on any 
merger. With regard to the private sector banks, the economic sense of merger is 
overshadowed by the prevailing sense of distrust among majority shareholders of 
different banks. The absence of a culture of distributed ownership of companies and 
banks, and the absence of laws safeguarding the rights of minority shareholders, are 
both impediments to mergers in the private sector.  
 
Due to the adverse effects of operating in an unrecognized country with a small 
population (small customer base) and a high number of banks on top of that, electronic 
banking services offered by the local banks have not yet reached to a satisfactory level.  
However, a probable solution to the Cyprus problem will definitely open the doors for 
the local banking sector to international networks like SWIFT, Visa and MasterCard, as 
the obstacles and membership denials once faced will eventually perish and the locals 
will then be able to compete fairly with both Turkish and Greek Cypriot banks. 
  
The following actions are recommended for creating a strong banking sector, 
invulnerable against future crises. 
• The 100% guarantee of deposits places a considerable burden on the state and 
to the banks insured, due to the high (1% of deposits) premium, it also creates 
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an environment where depositors are not induced to punish risk-taking 
institutions, through the withdrawal of deposits. Therefore, the 100% 
guarantee should be phased out and the insurance premium reduced. 
• Taxes and levies on loans should be removed, in order to bring down the cost 
of borrowing money. 
• Credit skills of the banking institutions should be enhanced by introducing 
proactive credit skill-building measures. 
• Innovation in products offered by banking institutions should be encouraged. 
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